Hindu Idol as a juristic person and its treatment in Ayodhya judgment
Ram Janambhumi, and Ram chabutra was taken as the birthplace of Lord Ram. The Demolition was followed by the enactment of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993.
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Written by Mohammad Arslaan Muin:
Introduction of Ayodhya Dispute :
The Ayodhya dispute is a century long dispute extending before the creation of India as a sovereign state. The dispute gained momentum after the sly installation of infant Lord Ram’s idol inside the central dome of Barbari masjid which was an exclusive property enjoyed by the Muslims for prayer at that time. The idol was installed on December 22nd, 1949 by Hindu devotees. This resulted in the revival of the dispute which was previously settled by the Colonial regime where outer courtyard was given to the Hindu devotees and the Mosque held by the Muslim devotees.
Ayodhya dispute a property dispute which transcended the norms of dealing with property dispute. The first case was filed by Shri Gopal Singh Visharad, who was friends with the District Magistrate K.K.K Nair, Nair later denied when was asked to remove the idols installed in the mosque (Truth cannot be a defence for contempt). The who thing was orchestrated by Gopal Singh and DM Nair. Despite this a wide margin of appreciation was given to the DM when his resolution was accepted, and he refused to remove the idols. Nair suggested that only pujaris should be allowed to visit the mosque to offer prayer and bhog and the rest of the public should be exempted to enter the mosque irrespective of their religion. The bias of DM Nair was prima facie admitted in the court of law and despite his contempt to carry the State request to remove the idols his suggestion was considered and became law. This act subtly replaced Muslim worship of mosque with a place of worship for the Hindus. Trespass was awarded by handing of possession in the inner dome.
Some decades later in 1986 a petition was filed by Umesh Chandra Pandey at the district court for the worship of deities which had been locked since 1949. It was allowed by K.M. Pandey the then District Magistrate of Faizabad allowed the petition to stand without any case file as it was with the Allahabad High Court. The sentence two wrongs make a right doesn’t stand ground in this case as in this case two wrongs further emphasized the bias of all the three pillars of constitution Parliament, Judiciary and Bureaucracy. No the possession of the Mosque was not only given to the pujaris but to general Hindu public as well and this spearhead the Ram Janambhumi movement, which resulted in the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992, where the last Namaz was offered on 16th December 1949.
The idea of Ram Janambhumi at the inner courtyard evolved with time, as the early writers like Savarkar who the forerunners of the Hindutva moment were never mentioned such an important detail which was the Ram Janambhumi, and Ram chabutra was taken as the birthplace of Lord Ram. The Demolition was followed by the enactment of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993. By virtue of this act the central government got possession over the disputed land and this was reaffirmed in the case of M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India. The Status quo was still maintained despite demolition and the Hindu worship continued whereas Muslims were yet again deprived of their right to religious freedom under Article 25 of the constitution.
Another question which arises is that whether the court has jurisdiction to decide upon such matter which goes back in time before the formation of Indian state. The answer if present courts can go and correct historical norms will only depend if there is a continuity which is either expressed or implied. Article 372 enforces continuity of British laws, which are not expressly repealed or amended, hence British resolution of the dispute should be accepted as there was no such continuity before the British laws and hence even if a temple existed under the rule of king Vikramaditya it cannot be decided upon this ended the debate on whether historical wrong can be corrected and the reach of Indian Courts jurisdiction.
The Allahabad high court gave a tripartite judgement which the name suggest divided the disputed land in three parts which were given to the Hindu idols, Sunni Waqf Board (Muslims) and the Nirmohi Akhada (suit 3, the managers/shebaits). The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the entire property should be taken as a whole. By doing this it rejected the British separation of the disputed land. The title was given to Suit Number 5 which was Ram Lalla Virajajman, representing a deity.
It was stated by the SC that idol as a juristic person is different from the land which is the Janambhumi. The idea of Land as a juristic person was denied by the Supreme Court over the fact that it will hinder the law of the land, as it would have given rise to many such claims and jurisprudence regarding property law would’ve taken a massive dip to an extend where ordinary law wouldn’t be able to deal with property dispute.
Juristic Person:
The Dakor Temple case, the usage of deity as a juristic person in this case find its roots in Roman law. The Court in this case drew a difference between the property rights of individual from that of a corporation. And hence the property falling under the corporation will have a juristic person who is created by the law. Property or quasi- property rights could be recognized through this juristic person. Now moving to the Suit 5 of Ayodhya where plaintiff one was a deity but the 2nd plaintiff was the disputed property itself “Ram Janambhumi”, hence if the land itself is treated as a juristic entity then will that be a claim for property dispute.
On Plaintiff being a “perpetual minor”, attracted the provision 6 of the Limitations act, as the God in this case was a perpetual minor and hence limitations wont run against him. Hindu scriptures were referred to reaffirm this claim by Justice Aggarwal, it was stated that adverse possession will not be a reason for the property of minors and temples being lost. The formation of Juristic personality is given weightage, when the worshippers who are united and a sense of community (Corporation) is created with Ram Lalla as a juristic personality representing the community will be justification enough to justify unity of worshippers and continuity of worship.
The Sunni Waqf Board (Suit 4) contested the claims of “juristic person” as it was among the parties which was claiming the title of disputed property. The Supreme court held that Juristic person is a creature of law which required two essential elements. First being the Endowments made by the person to this pious deity in who owns the property. Second being the legality of this pious purpose is affirmed in the eyes of law, which unites the worshipers and this will in turn ensure the perpetuality of the deity beyond the morality of some worshippers. Hence these two points ensure that the juristic person which is the deity is protected by law. One the faith and beliefs are established the deity will be recognized as a juristic person. Such intensive legal framework was indeed orchestrated by the court to give immunity to the property which carries the pious purpose which wasn’t even asked to prove and was just simply accepted by the court, in fact the court went beyond the way to construct such extensive framework for the Petitioners.
The Supreme Court itself cited Article 296 of the constitution, this article looks at the legal continuity between the colonial regime and the republic of India only with respect to Property matters, only exception to this article were when the titles were revoked or modified by the Government of India. This wasn’t the case with the disputed property. In this case even if the title deed wasn’t provided by the mosque, then also by the virtue of this article the Mosque’s legal recognition can be reinstated. The onus of proof should be on the Plaintiff of Suit 5 to prove its claim. The contestation was put by the court as to who had the possessory claim to the land as both the parties weren’t able to provide the title deed. Yet the colonial recognition of the inner courtyard belonging to the Muslims weren’t taken under consideration.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in this case showed unambiguous commitment to secularism and treated the disputed property more along the line of religious endowment of Ramlalla. There was no backing for such claim and yet Ramlalla was recognized as a juristic person and the disputed property as his endowment. It was further asserted by the supreme court that the intermingling of faith co-existed on the disputed land and yet the Supreme Court overturned Allahabad High courts decision. The Suit 4 claim to the inner courtyard was undeniable even during colonial and precolonial regime. The muslim prayers stopped within the mosque because they abide by the legal restriction which prevented them from worshipping whereas the property was very subtly shifted from Muslims to Hindu devotees. It is the first time in the history when trespass to property resulted in the possession of property, Ayodhya judgement is the only exception to Section 5 of Places of worship act 1991.
